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THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA HUSTON, Trustee of 
Trust A and Trust B under 
JOHN HUSTON, deceased, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
vs. 
RUSSELL R. LEWIS, MITZI 
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P l a i n t i f f s , 
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A p p e l l a n t s . 
Case No. 89-0476 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATELINE PROPERTIES, INC. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. 
Did the lower court err in refusing to extend the 
statutory redemption period further, after granting an extension 
of five weeks, to a party seeking to redeem real property sold at 
a foreclosure sale under Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, when the party seeking to redeem did not tender the 
full redemption amount, defined under Rule 69(f)(3), as ordered 
by the court? 
G:\wpl\O88\0O0OO83x.w51 
II. 
Is a party seeking redemption of real property sold at 
a foreclosure sale under Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, entitled to set off against the redemption amount any 
general damages allegedly caused to the property by the purchaser 
at the sale during the redemption period? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a ruling by the lower court at a 
hearing on October 2, 1989, by which the court ordered appellants 
Russell R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis (hereinafter the "Lewises") to 
pay into court the full amount necessary to redeem the subject 
real property by the close of business October 3, 1989, and 
ordering further that if the Lewises failed to deposit the money 
with the court within that period that their redemption rights 
would be deemed to have lapsed. (R. 649-55. ) 
B. Disposition of the Case Below-
On August 28, 1989, the Lewises obtained an ex parte 
order from the trial court extending the redemption period for a 
parcel of real property sold at a sheriff s sale on February 28, 
1989. (R. 502-05-) The purchaser of the real property, Appellee 
Stateline Property, Inc. (hereinafter "Stateline"), moved to 
dissolve the court' s order extending the redemption period. (R. 
549-52. ) On September 8, 1989, the court ordered the Lewises to 
-2-
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pay the full redemption amount into an interest bearing account 
within five days, and the redemption period would be extended to 
the next hearing on the matter. (Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, 
R. 660, at 3; R. 594. ) The Lewises did not pay the redemption 
amount. A further hearing was held on October 2, 1989, at which 
the court ordered the Lewises to pay the full redemption amount 
by October 3, 1989, or their redemption right would be deemed 
irrevocably lapsed. (R. 652-54.) Again, the Lewises failed to 
pay the redemption amount into court and their redemption rights 
were deemed to have lapsed. On November 13, 1989, the Lewises 
filed a Notice of Appeal (R. 656-57) from the court's ruling at 
the hearing of October 2, 1989, which was later memorialized in 
the Order of October 13, 1989. (R. 649-55. ) 
STATEMENT QF FACT? 
On or about February 28, 1989, Stateline purchased 
certain real property (the "property") at a foreclosure sale 
conducted by the Tooele County Sheriff. The property is located 
in Tooele County/ State of Utah, and was formerly known as the 
"Patio Motel." Stateline paid the amount of $210,000.00 in cash 
to purchase the property. In compliance with the desires of 
Tooele County Health and Human Services and the City of Wendover, 
Stateline caused the demolition of two units of the Patio Motel 
which had been gutted by fire and commenced work on the other 
units to prepare them for eventual demolition. Both the City of 
-3-
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Wendover and Tooele County had previously issued reports and 
orders that the units on the property be demolished because it 
was unsafe and unfit for habitation. (R. 553-64. ) l 
The Lewises claim to be creditors having a lien on the 
subject Property. (R. 504. ) At the Lewises' request, Stateline 
sent a letter to their counsel on August 28, 1989, outlining the 
amount due to redeem the Property. The amounts were as follows: 
Purchase price $210,000.00 
6% redemption fee 12, 600. 00 
1
 On February 11, 1989, just two weeks prior to the 
sheriff s sale, Tooele County Health and Human Services issued an 
inspection report which stated in part: 
Our inspection found the Patio Motel to be have 
[sic] significant health and safety risks to the 
public. It is my recommendation that all of the units 
be demolished or secured from entry by unauthorized 
personnel. 
In my opinion, only a very few of the units are 
repairable. In my opinion, it would be more cost 
effective for the owner to demolish the existing 
structures, and build a new motel than to bring the old 
motel into compliance. Most of the property within the 
buildings have been vandalized and is worth little or 
no value. 
The furtherest [sic] building north and west needs 
to be demolished as soon as possible because of health 
and safety problems. 
I would encourage you and your attorney to begin 
enforcement of the "Dangerous Building Abatement Code" 
on the Patio Motel before someone becomes injured in 
one of these dangerous structures. 
(R. 553. ) 
-4-
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Insurance 125. 00 
Property taxes 22,618. 53 
Repairs/maintenance 
securing of property 
(including materials 
and labor) 14, 134. 20 
SUBTOTAL $259, 599. 45 
Less net rents and profits 2. 878. 28 
TOTAL $256,599.45 
(R. 579. ) 
On August 28, 1989, (the date on which the six month 
redemption period was to run), the Lewises filed a "Motion to 
Extend Time for Redemption from sheriff s Sale for Order 
Permitting Inspection of Property. " (R. 502-05. ) On the same 
date, the Lewises obtained, ex parte, an order from the trial 
court extending the redemption period to October 10, 1989. (R. 
504. ) They also filed a "Petition for Determination of 
Reasonableness or Propriety of Redemption Amount," by which the 
Lewises alleged that Stateline had committed certain waste on the 
Property during the redemption period and seeking an order from 
the court entitling the Lewises to set off the damages incurred 
as a result of such waste against the amount necessary to redeem 
the Property. (R. 517-24.) On August 28, 1989, the Lewises also 
paid the sum of $50,000.00 into court as a partial tender of the 
amount due to redeem the Property. (R. 530-45.) 
After receiving notice of the ex parte order issued by 
the court on August 28, 1989, extending the redemption period, 
-5-
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Stateline filed a motion to dissolve the court' s order, which was 
heard on September 8, 1989. (R. 546-48.) At that hearing the 
court ruled from the bench and ordered the Lewises to pay the 
full redemption amount, approximately $256,000. 00, into an 
interest-bearing account agreeable to both sides within five days 
after the hearing. The court ordered further that, upon payment 
of the redemption amount, the redemption deadline would be 
extended until a future hearing, which the court tentatively set 
for September 27, 1989. (Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, R. 660, 
at 3; Minute Entry, R. 594. ) 2 The Lewises did not deposit the 
money with the court within five days after the hearing, as 
ordered by the court. (R. 631-32.) 
Following the September 8, 1989, hearing, counsel for 
Stateline prepared a written order to reflect the court' s ruling. 
(R. 611-15.) The Lewises' objected to the form of the proposed 
order. (R. 595-96.) Stateline filed a memorandum in support of 
the proposed order. (R. 611-24. ) Becsiuse the Lewises failed to 
deposit the full redemption amount into court, Stateline also 
filed a motion to strike the hearing that had been set for 
September 27, 1989. (R. 625-28, 605-10.) Both of these matters 
were heard by the court on October 2, 1989. 
2
 The hearing set for September 2 7, 1989, was for the 
purpose of introducing evidence on the issue whether Stateline 
committed waste on the property during the redemption period. 
(Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, R. 660, at 1-4. ) 
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Prior to the hearing on October 2, 1989, the appellant 
Russell R. Lewis filed an affidavit in which he attested that he 
had obtained the sum of $210,000.00 which, with the $50,000.00 
previously deposited in the court, would "complete the 
redemption of the property, no matter what the court determines 
the redemption price to be, which amount is now in escrow with 
Merrill Title Company . . . . " (R. 642, U 6. ) The Lewises also 
filed the Affidavit of Jeff Merrill, Vice President of Merrill 
Title Company, in which he stated that Merrill Title Company was 
"holding the sum of $210,000.00 in escrow for Russell R. Lewis 
for the purpose of redeeming the property involved in this action 
from the Sheriff's Sale to State Line [sic] Properties." (R. 
646, H 2. ) According to Merrill' s affidavit, the only condition 
for release of the funds was Russell Lewis giving a "first lien 
position on the property subject to this action in order to 
secure repayment of the funds" and delivering certificates of 
title to certain vehicles and an airplane to the lender as 
additional security. (R. 645, 11 3. ) At the hearing on October 
2, 1989, counsel for the Lewises also represented to the court 
that the Lewises had obtained the sum of $210,000.00, to be used 
to redeem the property. (Transcript of Oct. 2 hearing, R. 661, 
at 14, 28-29, 32, 35. ) 
At the hearing, the court ruled from the bench ordering 
that, by the close of business on October 3, 1989, the Lewises 
-7-
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were to deposit in an escrow account the total sum of $256,000, 
"and some odd cents and dollars" by 5:00 p.m. on October 3, 1989, 
less the $50,000 which the Lewises had previously paid into 
court. (Oct. 2 Transcript, R. 661, at 38. ) The court further 
ordered the Lewises to cause the escrow agent to make and deliver 
to Stateline' s counsel a written acknowledgement that such funds 
were being held in escrow and a written commitment to pay 
promptly the full amount of such sum held in escrow to 
Stateline' s order concurrently with the conveyance to the Lewises 
of fee title the Property. (Oct. 2 Transcript, R. 661, at 37-
44. ) The Lewises failed to object to the court's order at the 
hearing. To the contrary, their counsel represented to the court 
that they had the money and would be able to perform. (Oct. 2 
Transcript, R. 661, at 14, 28-29, 32, 35-44. ) The court' s ruling 
at the hearing was later memorialized in the written order filed 
October 13, 1989, from which the Lewises appeal. (R. 649-55.) 
The Lewises failed to cause the written acknowledgement 
to be made and delivered to Stateline By October 3, 1989, as 
ordered by the court. 3 By operation of the court' s order at the 
3
 In their brief, the Lewises admit that they failed to 
comply with the court' s order that the sum of $256,000 by 
deposited in escrow. (Lewises' Brief, at 7. ) The Lewises also 
attempt to introduce evidence regarding the reasons for their 
failure, without any support in the record. !£. Because their 
statements in their brief are unsupported by the record, this 
Court should disregard such evidence. 
-8-
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hearing of October 2, (later memorialized in the order filed 
October 13, 1989), the Lewises' redemption rights were deemed to 
have irrevocably lapsed. (R. 652. ) 
The Lewises appealed from the Order of October 13, 
1989. (R. 656-57. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Lewises' redemption rights have lapsed because 
of their failure to comply with the court' s orders. Even after 
having a five week extension of the normal redemption period the 
Lewises did not tender the redemption amount. Because an 
extension of the redemption period affects Stateline' s 
substantive rights, the Lewises' strict compliance with the 
provisions of Rule 69(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
required. An allegation of waste is not an "appropriate 
instance" justifying an extension of the redemption period within 
the meaning of Mollerup v. Storage Systems International. 569 
P. 2d 1122 (Utah 1977). 
2. The statutory rules governing redemption do not 
allow the Lewises to set off or recoup their alleged unliquidated 
claim for waste against the liquidated redemption amount. Rule 
69(g)(1) specifically provides that a person who purchased 
property at a sheriff's sale may sue a tenant who injured the 
property during the redemption period after the purchaser' s 
estate has been made absolute. Because the Lewises' did not make 
-9-
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their estate absolute by complying with the requirements of Rule 
69(f), they have no standing to make a claim against Stateline 
for injuries that were allegedly caused to the property during 
the redemption period. 
3. Stateline is not a party to this action, never 
having been served with process. Principles of due process 
require that Stateline be given full notice of the claim against 
it for injury to the property, through service of a summons and 
complaint. Determining whether Stateline is liable to the 
Lewises for injury to the property under the two-day hearing 
requirement of Rule 69(f)(3) would violate the requirements of 
due process. A claim for waste to property requires full notice 
of the allegations and a full opportunity for discovery and 
should not be disposed of on an expedited hearing. 
4. The lower court did not err in hearing Stateline' s 
motion to dissolve the court' s ex parte order extending the 
redemption period on two days' notice. In any event, the Lewises 
were given additional time to tender the redemption amount into 
court and were not prejudiced by the court's order at the hearing 
held on September 8, 1989. 
ARQVMEPT 
I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY ORDERED THAT THE LEWISES' 
REDEMPTION RIGHTS HAD LAPSED AND EQUITY DOES 
NOT REQUIRE AN EXTENSION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD. 
- 1 0 -
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A. The lower court properly heig that the redemption 
per iod expi red on Qgtofrer 3, 1999, fQr fflilyire of the 
Lewises t o comply with i t s order t h a t the f u l l 
redemption ftmgynt fre flePQgitefl i n <=m eggrow »q<?Q\int. 
Under Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Lewises' redemption right would ordinarily have lapsed on August 
28, 1989, which was six months following the Sheriff s sale. On 
August 28, 1989, however, the Lewises obtained an ex parte order 
from the court extending the redemption period to October 10, 
1989. (R. 504. ) The Lewises thereafter failed to comply with 
the court' s orders at the hearings on September 28, 1989, and 
October 2, 1989, that they deposit the full redemption amount 
with the court. Because the extension of the redemption period 
affected Stateline' s rights in the property, the Lewises were 
required to comply strictly with the provisions of Rule 69(f)(3). 
In Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P. 2d 
1122 (Utah 1977), this Court considered whether the lower court 
had properly ordered an extension of a redemption period. The 
Court held that a person seeking redemption must be strictly held 
to the provisions of the statute: 
The right of redemption has long freen recognized 3§ A 
substantive right to fee exerciser in strict accorfl with 
statutory terms. It is not an equitable right created 
or regulated by principles of equity but, rather, is a 
creature of statute and depends entirely upon the 
provisions of the statute creating the right. 
Id. at 1124 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) 
-11-
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The Court further acknowledged that "a court, sitting 
in equity, may in appropriate instances extend the [redemption] 
period." I£. at 1124 (emphasis added). Such "appropriate 
instances," however, typically involve circumstances which 
indicate "fraud, mistake, accident or waiver." X£. The Court 
reversed the lower court' s order extending the redemption period 
because such appropriate instances had not been shown. In 
Mollerup. the party obtaining the extension (Green) had not made 
a tender of the redemption sum but filed an affidavit alleging 
the redemption figures were questionable and not timely 
furnished. Upon review, this Court determined that Green did not 
have the financial means to redeem the property but was hopeful 
of using the extended redemption period to find a purchaser for 
his right of redemption. I&. at 1124. The Court held that the 
extension as granted was not based upon a showing of adequate 
cause as required under Rule 6(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and amounted to an abuse of discretion under the facts of the 
case. The Court also expressed its concern that permitting an 
extension of the period of redemption under the circumstances 
presented by Green would treat the purchaser at the sale 
inequitably. The Court stated: 
To determine otherwise would allow others 
similarly situated to simply appear ex parte, 
assert a dispute, a possible sale of the 
right to redeem, or some other self-serving 
-12-
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matter and the effect would be to abridge the 
rights of a purchaser at sale. 
UL at 1125. 
The present case presents the same kind of situation. 
In order to gain an extension the Lewises appeared ex parte and 
asserted a self-serving dispute claiming that Stateline committed 
waste on the property. The Lewises, at the time, did not have 
the present financial ability to tender the required redemption 
sum and were hoping to buy more time to get their financing in 
order.4 At the September 8, 1989, hearing, the court allowed 
the Lewises to tender the redemption amount within five days as a 
condition of an extension of the redemption period. (Sept. 8 
Transcript, R. 660, at 3. ) The Lewises, however, did not tender 
the redemption amount. 
At the October 2, 1989, hearing, the court overlooked 
the Lewises' failure to pay the redemption amount within five 
days following the September 8th hearing, and ordered that they 
could have until the close of business on October 3 within which 
to tender the redemption amount into court. This order was based 
on the representations by counsel for the Lewises that the 
4
 On August 25, 1989, an attorney representing the Lewises 
informed Stateline' s counsel that the Lewises did not have the 
financing available to redeem the property and that there would 
be no redemption. (R. 583, U 4. ) The Lewises' present counsel 
appeared three days later and filed the ex parte motion for an 
extension. (R. 502-05. ) 
-13-
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Lewises had sufficient funds available in escrow to redeem the 
property. (Oct. 2 Transcript, R. 660, at 14, 28-29, 32, 35, 38; 
R. 651-54. ) Again, the Lewises failed to tender the redemption 
amount. Given the plain fact that the Lewises did not have the 
money as represented, the lower court did not err in ordering 
that their redemption rights lapsed on October 3, 1989. 
B. No "appropriate instances" existed to allow any further 
extensions of the redemption period. 
The Lewises argue that equity called for the extension 
of the redemption period. They contend that the concept of 
"appropriate instances," described by this Court in Mollerup 
should somehow be broadened to include the facts of this case. 
Moreover, the Lewises broadly assert, for the first time on 
appeal, that Stateline may have engaged in some kind of "wrongful 
activity" that would justify an equitable extension. (Lewises' 
Brief, at 16). This kind of broad and unsupported accusation is 
precisely what Mollerup warned against. 5 
In an attempt to justify their position that they have 
established an "appropriate instance" for a further extension of 
the redemption period, the Lewises rely upon United States v. 
5
 There is no evidence in the record that Stateline 
"intentionally destroyed the improvements on the property in an 
attempt to make it impossible for Lewises to redeem. " (Lewises' 
Brief, at 16. ) This Court cannot hold that the lower court 
should have granted a further extension of the redemption period 
based on speculations and unfounded accusations. 
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Loosley, 551 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1976), in which a redemption was 
allowed in spite of a technical failure to comply with the 
redemption rule. Loosley did not involve an extension of the 
redemption period. In Loosley. a purchaser at a sheriff s sale 
refused to accept tender of the redemption amount offered within 
the original six month redemption period. The redeeming party 
had tendered a good check for the correct amount to the 
purchaser' s attorney, but neglected to deliver it with a 
certified copy of the docket of judgment or memorandum of 
judgment along with an affidavit showing the amount actually due, 
all of which were required by law. The check was also sent to 
the wrong person, although the purchaser had actual notice of the 
tender. I£. at 507. The Court held that the failure to satisfy 
these technicalities did not prevent the redemption because the 
purchaser waited eight days (allowing the redemption period to 
lapse) before objecting to the tender and had therefore waived 
any objections. 
The Lewises argue that the redemption allowed by the 
Court in Loosley "was upheld not because of fraud, mistake, 
accident, or waiver," but only because of a failure to comply 
with certain "technicalities" required by the law. (Lewises' 
Brief, at 15-16. ) The Lewises misread Loosley. The "technical" 
defects in the redemptioner' s tender in that case are prime 
examples of mistake or accident and do not create an "appropriate 
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instance" for extending the redemption period beyond the 
principles described in Mollerup. The Court in Mollerup, 569 
P. 2d at 1124, specifically cited Loosley as an example of 
accident, mistake, or waiver justifying relief from the strict 
requirements of the rule. 
In the recent case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. v. 
Gavilan Operating. Inc. , 787 P. 2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals stated that an extension of a redemption period 
is not a "technical" matter within the meaning of Loosley. The 
Court considered whether the holdings of Mollerup and Looslev are 
inconsistent: 
Mollerup and Loosley, though seemingly inconsistent, 
are readily reconciled. Very simply, not all 
redemption provisions are alike. Courts, in evaluating 
the necessity for strict compliance in these kinds of 
cases, focus upon the nature of the statutory 
requirements and the likelihood of prejudice. If 
failure to adhere to the requirements will affect a 
substantive right of one of the parties and possibly 
prejudice that party, then courts require strict 
compliance. On the other hand, if the requirements are 
merely procedural and will not prejudice one of the 
parties, substantial compliance is sufficient. 
L4. at 1333. 
The Court of Appeals considered the factual difference 
between Mollerup and Loosley. The Court concluded that the 
extension of the redemption period at issue in Mollerup was a 
substantive right requiring strict compliance with the redemption 
rule while the technical failures in Loosley did not affect 
-16-
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substantive rights, thus justifying the lesser standard of 
"substantial compliance." I£. at 1333-34. The Court stated 
further: 
Our Supreme Court in Mollerup was construing Rule 
69(f)(3) which sets a time limit of six months in which 
redemption must be made. This provision clearly 
affects $ substantive right Of the pyrchgiser, .
 f T Tp 
allow redemption beyond the six-month period inevitably 
compromises and prejudices the purchaser' s interest 
Consequently, the Court concluded that absent some 
significant facts to "move the conscience" of the 
Courti it would not extend the redemption period-
lii- at 1333 (citations omitted; emphasis added. ) 
Thus, Looslev is clearly distinguishable since it did 
not involve the substantive rights of the parties as did 
Mollerup. In Loosley, unlike the Lewises in the present case, 
the redeeming party actually tendered the full redemption amount 
within the redemption period. Clearly, Loosley provides no 
support for the Lewises. 
The Lewises' failure to tender the full amount can in 
not be characterized as a "technical" defect like the failure to 
deliver a certified copy of the judgment in Loosley. The tender 
of the full redemption amount is the very essence of the 
redemption procedure. Failure to remove preconditions on money 
potentially to be tendered is no tender. State v. Peterson. 308 
Or. 632, 784 P.2d 1076, 1078 (1989) (en banc) ("A debtor who 
seeks to redeem must follow the statutory terms by ' paying the 
amount of purchase money' and must do so unconditionally"). The 
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holding in Loosley was consistent with the "appropriate 
instances" doctrine of Mollerup because the purchaser had waived 
his right to object to the deficiencies of the redemptioner's 
tender. 551 P. 2d at 508. The Lewises do not claim that 
Stateline waived its rights. Loosley is a different case than 
the present one and provides no support for the Lewises. 
c. There is no evidence in the regpyfl to support the 
Lewises' statements that they were hindered from 
obtaining the fvuifls necessary to redeem the property. 
In their brief, the Lewises allege that they were 
"hindered in their efforts to obtain funds to redeem the 
property. " (Lewises' Brief, at 13, 23, 37. ) This factual 
allegation, however, has no support whatsoever in the record. 
There is no evidence that the Lewises were unable to raise the 
money to redeem the property because of any conduct of Stateline. 
The Lewises presented no such evidence to the lower court, and 
this Court should disregard such unfounded and unsupported 
contentions. 6 
The Lewises were, in fact, successful in raising the 
necessary funds, which they represented to the court by the 
affidavits of Russell R. Lewis and Jeff Merrill (R. 642, 646) and 
6
 As Stateline demonstrated to the court below, its efforts 
in demolishing two burned-out units on the property during the 
redemption period were justified by the property' s unsafe 
condition, as noted by governmental inspections that had been 
made of the property. (R. 553-64. ) 
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by statements made by the Lewises' counsel at the hearing on 
October 2, 1989. (Transcript of October 2 hearing, R. 661, at 
14, 28-29, 32, 35. ) There is no evidence in the record that the 
Lewises were delayed or hindered at all by any actions of 
Stateline in obtaining the $210,000, which they informed the 
court were on deposit at Merrill Title Company as of the date of 
the October 2, 1989, hearing. Similarly, there is no evidence in 
the record explaining why the money, admittedly on deposit at the 
title company, was not paid into court pursuant to the court1 s 
order at the October 2 hearing. 
This Court should hold that the Lewises had ample 
opportunity, far beyond the normal six month redemption period, 
within which to raise the money to redeem the property and to 
tender it into court. The cumulative effect of the court' s 
orders of August 28, 1989, (R. 504), September 8, 1989, (R. 594; 
R. 660), and October 2, 1989, (R. 649-55), was to give the 
Lewises until October 3, 1989, within which to tender the money, 
five weeks after the redemption period should have expired under 
Rule 69(f). Stateline is not responsible for the Lewises' 
financial problems nor for their difficulties in raising the 
money to redeem the property. 
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II. 
THE LEWISES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SET OFF 
AGAINST THE REDEMPTION AMOUNT ANY DAMAGES 
CLAIMED AS A RESULT OF WASTE ALLEGEDLY 
COMMITTED BY STATELINE DURING THE REDEMPTION PERIOD. 
A. The Lewises have no standing to make a claim against 
Stateline for injury to the property because they 
failed to redeem the property and make their estate 
absolute, as required bv Rule 69(g)(1). 
The Lewises' fundamental claim is that they are 
entitled to set off or recoup against the liquidated redemption 
amount the unliquidated damages that they claim resulted from 
alleged waste committed by Stateline to the property during the 
redemption period. The thrust of the Lewises' argument is that 
equity allows set off and recoupment, and that such equitable 
principles should apply here. While equity may play a role in 
determining whether to extend the statutory period, this Court in 
Mollerup clearly stated the rule that: 
The right of redemption has long been recognized as & 
substantive right to *re exercised in strict accord with 
Statutory terms. It is not an equitable right created 
or regulated by principles of equity but, rather, is a 
creature of statute and depends entirely upon the 
provisions of the statute creating the right. 
569 P. 2d at 1124 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). See Tech-
Fluid Services, lnc« v» gavilan Operating! inc., 787 P. 2d 1328, 
1333 (Utah App. 1990) ("If failure to adhere to the requirements 
will affect a substantive right of one of the parties and 
possibly prejudice that party, then courts require strict 
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compliance"); Johnson v. Smith, 675 P. 2d 307, 310 (Colo. 1984) 
(en banc) (court held that statutory redemption "is not a right 
derived from equity, but depends entirely upon the provisions of 
the statute creating the right."). 
Utah law governing the right of redemption does not 
provide for an equitable set-off or recoupment for injury caused 
to the property during the redemption period. According to Rule 
69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the redemption amount is 
the sum of the following: 
1. Amount of the purchase. 
2. Six percent of the amount of purchase. 
3. Assessments or taxes. 
4. Reasonable sums necessary for fire insurance. 
5. Reasonable sums necessary for maintenance, upkeep, 
or repair of any improvements on the property paid 
by the purchaser after the purchase, with interest 
on such amounts. 
The rule does not allow a would-be redemptioner to 
assert a set-off for waste. Rule 69(f)(6) expressly allows for 
the set-off of the amount of rent or profits from the property, 
but again, waste committed on the property during the redemption 
period is not mentioned as a factor to be considered in 
determining the redemption amount. Because the right of 
redemption is a "creature of statute," Mollerup v. Storage 
Systems International. 569 P. 2d at 1124, this Court should not 
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imply an equitable right of set-off where none is allowed by Rule 
69(f). 
Moreover, Rule 69(g)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically provides a remedy to a redemptioner where the 
property was injured during the redemption period. That rule 
specifies the procedure by which damages for waste may be 
recovered. Rule 69(g)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states 
that after a purchaser' s estate has become absolute, he, or his 
successor in interest, may maintain an action to recover damages 
for injury to the property by the party in possession during the 
redemption period. Rule 69(g)(1) states: 
(g) fiemedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time 
allowed for redemption, the court may restrain the 
commission of waste on the property, upon motion, with 
or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor 
in interest. But it is not waste for the person in 
possession of the property at the time of the sale, or 
entitled to possession afterwards, during the period 
allowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the 
same manner in which it is was previously used, or to 
use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to make 
the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use 
wood or timber on the property therefor, or for the 
repair of fences, or for fuel for his family while he 
occupies the property. After his estate has become 
absolute, the purchaser or his successor in interest 
may maintain an action to recover damages for injury to 
the property bv the tenant in possession after sale and 
before possession is delivered under the conveyance-
(emphasis added. ) 
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Thus, under Rule 69(g)(1), the Lewises would not be 
entitled to make a claim against Stateline for damages for injury 
to the property allegedly caused by Stateline until after their 
estate in the property had become absolute. Their estate could 
only have been made absolute by their redeeming the property for 
the full amount set forth in Rule 69(f)(3) and by waiting until 
the six month redemption period had run without further 
redemption. Had the Lewises paid the full redemption amount and 
obtained a sheriff s deed to the property, they would have 
standing to sue for waste committed during the redemption period. 
As it is, they have no standing to make a claim against Stateline 
for waste allegedly committed during the redemption period. Only 
after they become the owners of the property do they have the 
right to make such claims. 
Rule 69(g)(1) specifically provides the remedy 
available to the "purchaser or his successor in interest" for 
injury to the property during the redemption period. The Lewises 
argue that the language "purchaser or his successor in interest" 
would not include a party who had redeemed the property. 
(Lewises Brief, at 35. ) The Lewises do not explain, however, 
how it is that they would not be "purchasers" of the property if 
they paid money to redeem the property. A "purchaser" by 
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definition is one who pays money for property. Rule 69(g)(1) 
plainly contemplates that the "purchaser" is the person who ends 
up paying money to buy the property, whether at a sheriff s sale 
or through redemption. Under the Lewises7 interpretation of Rule 
69(g)(1), only the person who pays money at a sheriffs sale, and 
not the party who redeemed the property, has the right to sue the 
tenant in possession for injury to the property. Distinguishing 
between a purchaser and a redemptioner based on status of the 
person to whom the money was paid makes little sense. It should 
not matter whether the money was paid to the sheriff or to a 
purchaser at a sheriffs sale. If a person who purchased at a 
sheriff s sale has a right to sue a tenant in possession for 
injury to the property, then so does a person who redeems by 
paying the first purchaser. Any other result would treat the 
redemptioner harshly without any justifiable basis. 
Thus, for example, if a creditor redeems property 
purchased by another at a sale he becomes the "purchaser" under 
Rule 69(g)(1) and is entitled to all remedies available to the 
7
 Black' s Law Dictionary defines the term "purchaser" as 
"[o]ne who acquired real property in any other mode than by 
descent. One who acquires either real or personal property by 
buying it for a price in money; a buyer; vendee. " Black' s Law 
Dictionary at 1399 (4th ed. 1968). See Webster' s Third New 
International Dictionary at 1845 (1976); B^ver yT m e s , 109 
Ohio App. 164, 164 N. E. 2d 429, 436 (1958) ("the word 'purchaser' 
means one who, for valuable present consideration, acquires 
property or an interest in property"). 
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first purchaser. If another lien creditor with the right of 
redemption thereafter redeems the property from the first 
creditor, as provided for in Rule 69(f)(4), that second creditor 
also has the remedies of a purchaser or his successor in 
interest. The person who ultimately makes his estate in the 
property "absolute," in the words of Rule 69(g)(1), is the one 
who has standing to sue those who may have injured the property 
during the redemption period. Thus, had the Lewises properly 
redeemed the property, they would have become the "purchasers" or 
the "successors in interest" to the purchaser and would have all 
of the rights that Stateline had when it paid for the property at 
the sheriff s sale. 
The Lewises1 argument that equity should supplement 
Rule 69(f)(3), is inconsistent with their unreasonably limited 
construction of Rule 69(g)(1). The two rules should be read and 
construed so as to be consistent with each other. Simply put, 
Rule 69(f)(3) describes, as the headings indicate, the "time for 
redemption; amount to be paid." Rule 69(g)(1) sets forth the 
"remedies for purchaser" "for waste." The drafters of Rule 69 
clearly provided a means for a purchaser to bring claims for 
waste done to the property during the redemption period, but the 
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purchaser must first make his estate "absolute."8 This the 
Lewises failed to do. Rule 69(f)(3) simply does not given them 
the right to pursue claims against Stateline for injury to the 
property. 
The Lewises also contend that the term "tenant in 
possession," used in Rule 69(g)(1) does not include Stateline. 
(Lewises' Brief, at 35. ) Again, their reading of the rule is 
unduly narrow. A "tenant" is one who has an interest in real 
property.9 A "tenant in possession" is one who has possession 
of property. During the redemption period, Stateline was a 
"tenant in possession." Thus, under Rule 69(g)(1), if Stateline 
injured the property during the redemption period, and had the 
Lewises properly redeemed the property, then the Lewises as the 
"purchasers" would have the right to sue Stateline, as a "tenant 
Rule 69(f)(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, describes 
how a purchaser makes his estate absolute. Under the rule, if 
there has been no redemption, the purchaser "is entitled to a 
sheriff s deed at the expiration of six months after the sale." 
If there has been a redemption, the redemptioner is entitled to a 
sheriff s deed at the end of that period of time. Because the 
Lewises did not redeem within the six month period, nor within 
the additional time allowed by the court, they did not make their 
estate "absolute" within the meaning of the rule. 
9
 Black' s Law Dictionary defines the term "tenant" as, 
"[i]n the broadest sense, one who holds or possesses lands or 
tenements by any kind of right or title, whether in fee, for 
life, for years, at will, or otherwise." Black' s Law Dictionary 
at 1635 (4th ed. 1968). £a& Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary at 2355 (1976); Bessinaer v. Grotz, 66 Cal. App. 2d, 
153 P. 2d 369, 370 (1944); Caldwell v. Thiessen. 60 Idaho 515, 92 
P. 2d 1047, 1048-49 (1939). 
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in possession," for the injury to the property done while 
Stateline was the tenant in possession. 10 
Because the Lewises did not properly redeem the 
property, they have no estate in it. They have no standing to 
make a claim for waste against Stateline and are not entitled, 
under Rule 69 or otherwise, to set off an unliquidated claim for 
damages against the liquidated redemption amount owed under Rule 
69(f)(3). That rule provides very specifically how the 
redemption amount is to be calculated and when it is to be paid. 
Under the Lewises' reading of Rule 69, a would-be redemptioner 
can claim a set-off against the purchaser and refuse to pay the 
full redemption amount until after a trial has been held on the 
amount of the set-off. This is a result plainly not contemplated 
by the drafters of Rule 69(f). 
10
 In their brief, the Lewises argue that Rule 69(g)(1): 
was obviously not drafted in contemplation of a 
destruction of the property by the purchaser in 
violation of the rights of redemption. Rather, it was 
meant to deal with waste committed by a party already 
in possession of the property, who could be the 
judgment debtor or his tenant, in violation of the 
rights of the purchaser. 
(Lewises1 Brief, at 35.) Thus, the Lewises claim that the term 
"tenant in possession" in Rule 69(g)(1) means only a person "who 
could be the judgment debtor or his tenant. " This argument is 
unduly narrow and ignores the fact that, as in the present case, 
the purchaser at the sheriff s sale is generally given possession 
of the property after buying it at the sale. The sensible 
interpretation of the term "tenant in possession" as used in Rule 
69(g)(1) includes the purchaser at the sale. 
G:\wpl\088\0000O83x.w51 
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The case of Goodwin v. Donahue. 299 Ala. 66, 155 So. 
587 (1934), involved a similar issue. There, the Alabama Supreme 
Court refused to allow a party attempting to redeem land to set 
off against the amount due to redeem the property the amount of 
waste or rents. The court said: "It is well settled that one in 
possession of land, as purchaser at a mortgage sale . . . is not 
chargeable with rent or waste. '• L4. at 589. The court 
continued: "However, the purchaser, or his vender, may become 
liable to account for rents occurring, or for waste committed or 
suffered, after an offer to redeem, accompanied by a tender, has 
been made. " £&. (emphasis added. ) See also Hansen v. Day, 99 
Or. 387, 195 P. 344 (1921) (en banc) (claim for set-off for waste 
must come in an action separate from the redemption 
proceeding). n 
B. Rule 69(f)(3) does not entitle the Lewises to a hearing 
on the question wfrettey gtrteiige comntittefl inivry to 
the property during the redemption period. 
The Lewises contend that they were entitled to a 
hearing under Rule 69(f)(3) on the question whether Stateline 
committed waste on the property during the redemption period. 
(Lewises7 Brief, at 24, 30-32. ) The first paragraph of Rule 
69(f)(3) describes in detail the sums to which a purchaser is 
11
 Utah, by rule, allows rents to be set off against the 
redemption amount, Rule 69(f)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
but codified the common law as to waste in Rule 69(g)(1). 
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entitled from a redemptioner. The second paragraph describes the 
process for resolving objections to any such sum demanded by the 
purchaser, as follows: 
In the event there is a disagreement as to 
whether frny swn flgm»nfl9fl for yefrgmpUpn is 
reasonable or proper, the person seeking 
redemption may pay the amount necessary for 
redemption, less the amount in dispute, to 
the court out of which execution or order 
authorizing the sale was issue, and at the 
same time file with the court a petition 
setting forth the item or items demanded to 
which he objects, together with his grounds 
of objection; and thereupon the court shall 
enter an order fixing a time for hearing of 
such objections. A copy of the petition and 
order fixing time for hearing shall be served 
on the purchaser not less than two days 
before the day of hearing. Upon the hearing 
of the objections the court shall enter an 
order determining the amount required for 
redemption. In the event an additional 
amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk 
is required, the person seeking redemption 
shall pay to the clerk such additional amount 
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith 
execute and deliver a proper certificate of 
redemption upon being paid the amount 
required by the court for redemption. 
(Emphasis added. ) 
This paragraph applies only to disputes over the 
amounts demanded by the purchaser, a point plainly acknowledged 
by the Lewises.12 The second paragraph of Rule 69(f)(3) does 
12
 In their brief the Lewises quote the second paragraph of 
Rule 69(f)(3). They concede that lf[i]t is true that the prior 
paragraph of Rule 69(f)(3) lists only items which may be added to 
the redemption price and not items to be deducted therefrom. " 
(Lewises' Brief, at 24. ) 
-29-
6 \wpl\088\0000083x w51 
not authorize the court to conduct a trial on the issue whether 
the purchaser committed waste to the property that should be 
deducted from the purchase price. The hearing provided for in 
the rule, which may be held on two days' notice, is solely for 
the purpose of determining whether the purchaser is entitled to 
all of the amounts demanded. 
Thus, in the present case Stateline demanded certain 
sums13 in order for the Lewises to redeem the property. Under 
the procedure in Rule 69(f)(3), had the Lewises objected to any 
such sums, they would have had to pay the undisputed amount into 
court and then would be entitled to a hearing on their 
objections. Thus, for example, had the Lewises questioned 
whether Stateline had paid the sum of $22,618. 53 for property 
taxes, they would be entitled to have a hearing to determine 
whether that was a proper amount for Stateline to demand. They 
are not, however, entitled to a hearing on the issue whether 
Stateline injured the property during the redemption period. 
Rule 69(f)(3) provides that the hearing is to be held on two days 
notice. It is inconceivable that the drafters of Rule 69 
envisioned a full trial on an issues of waste on only two days 
notice. Whether property was injured during the redemption 
13
 In addition to the $210,000 purchase price and the 6 
percent fee, Stateline demanded payment of $125.00 for insurance, 
$22,618.53 for property taxes, and $14,134.20 for repairs and 
maintenance. (R. 579. ) 
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period must be resolved through the normal litigation process, 
specifically provided for by Rule 69(g)(1). 
C. EgyitY #039 not jtllQW f<?r the gqfr-pff Qr recoupment pf 
unliquidated claims for waste. 
Even if this Court interprets Rule 69(f)(3) according 
to equitable principles, the Court should also hold that the 
liquidated redemption amount may not be set off by the Lewises' 
unliquidated damage claim. The redemption amount is liquidated 
and easily calculable under the formula set forth in Rule 
69(f)(3). The Lewises' claims for damages are unliquidated and 
speculative. The law is clear that the Lewises are not entitled 
to set off a liquidated and uncontested obligation with an 
unliquidated speculative claim for damages. 
In King v. Firm. 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P. 2d 1114 (1955), 
the Utah Supreme Court considered whether a tenant to whom a 
landlord owed a sum of money was entitled to set off the amount 
due to him by the landlord against his rent payments. The 
landlord had terminated the lease and evicted the tenant for 
nonpayment of rent. The Supreme Court, holding for the landlord, 
stated that even though the tenant was entitled to a judgment for 
the sum owed to him by the landlord, "the debt will not excuse 
performance of his contract." LcL. at 1117 (citation omitted). 
The rule is equally applicable in the present case. The Lewises, 
who owe a liquidated amount to redeem the property, are not 
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entitled to set off that amount against the unliquidated claim 
for damages they claim to have suffered as a result of the 
injuries allegedly committed by Stateline to the property. 
The Lewises argue that King supports their position. 
(Lewises' Brief, at 26-27. ) They cite the passage which reads: 
Thus under some circumstances a tenant would be 
required to pay the rent or lose his rights to the 
property under the lease although the landlord owed him 
more money than the amount of the rent. This possibly 
would not be so if it were undisputed that there was 
presently due and owing from the landlord to the tenant 
more money than the amount due . . . and the defendant 
definitely claimed the right to offset one claim 
against the other. 
285 P. 2d at 1117 (emphasis added). 
The Court in King continues, however, to say that they 
do not answer this question because in King, the tenant' s claim 
was disputed. King thus firmly supports Stateline' s position by 
holding that a liquidated claim (an undisputed amount due and 
owing) may be offset by a defendant against a claim by a suing 
plaintiff. The Lewises' claim, as in King, is disputed and not 
an "amount due and owing" from Stateline. King squarely holds 
that liquidated amounts cannot be set off against unliquidated 
amounts* 
in N\rtter Y» Occidental Petroleum frand fr PevelppnMgnt, 
Corp. . 117 Ariz. 548, 573 P. 2d 532 (1977), the court considered 
whether the defendants were entitled to set off general damages 
they claimed to have suffered against the liquidated amounts they 
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owed under a promissory note. Affirming the trial court' s grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the court relied 
on the general rule that "unliquidated damages ordinarily cannot 
be set off at law," and that "in matters of setoff equity usually 
follows the law. " I£. at 534. The Court stated further: 
The Nutters failed, as they admitted, to make 
a timely interest payment. They defended, in 
effect, on the grounds that the setoff if 
proved and allowed would equal payment in 
that the amount of claimed setoff exceeded 
the amount due on the note. 
Such a defense has been disallowed in 
Arizona. A claimed setoff does not 
constitute payment of the obligations due and 
owing under a note and mortgage. . . . "A set 
off for counterclaim does not amount to 
payment, since there has been no delivery of 
money by the debtor to the creditor. " The 
setoff, even if allowed, could not avoid a 
judgment of foreclosure. 
Id. at 535 (citations omitted). 
As the Lewises concede, Nutter indicates that departure 
from the rule is allowed only when "some special equity exists." 
(Lewises' Brief, at 28. ) The Lewises give examples of the kinds 
of equities that would justify the allowance of an unliquidated 
claim as including of fraud, insolvency, nonresidence of a party, 
insolvency, or "embarrassment in enforcing the demand at law." 
(Lewises' Brief, at 29) (quoting Cfrlforell yt gtgYeng, 64 Okl. 
287, 167 P. 610 (1917)). These exceptions do not apply in the 
present case, but concern parties who are dishonest, judgment 
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proof, or beyond the jurisdiction of the court against whom a 
rightful judgment in a subsequent proceeding would be impossible 
or futile. The Lewises have not established that they bear this 
kind of risk in the present case. 
The court in Nutter, rejected claims of insolvency and 
inequitable behavior and found no special equity allowing an 
unliquidated set-off. According to the court "[t]he situation 
between the parties is not such that justice cannot otherwise be 
done. •' 573 P. 2d at 534. As in Nutter, the Lewises have a 
specific right to sue Stateline for waste, provided they have 
first obtained title to the property through redemption. 
In Investor Inns Inc. v. Wallace. 408 So. 2d 978 (La. 
App. 1981), the plaintiff, as landlord, brought a summary 
eviction proceeding against the defendant for nonpayment of rent. 
The defendant alleged in response that the eviction proceeding 
was improper because at the time of suit the plaintiff was 
indebted to him in an amount larger than plaintiff s claim for 
rent. The defendant argued that by operation of law a set-off 
occurred, thereby extinguishing the plaintiff s claim for rent. 
IdL. at 982. The court rejected this argument/ holding for the 
landlord, stating: 
To be applicable, compensation or set off 
requires the contemporaneous existence of 
distinct/ liquidated, and fully demandable 
debts. . . . 
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A determination of the liquidity of the 
debt is an essential prerequisite to deciding 
whether the claim is a proper basis for a 
plea for compensation. Lack of sufficient 
liquidity and demandability will preclude 
such a plea. 
. . . . Compensation is therefore not 
available in these proceedings to offset the 
debt owed by defendant for unpaid rent. 
Id. at 983 (footnote and citation omitted). See Skinner v. W. 
T. Grant Co. , 642 F. 2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1981) ("a contested 
debt may not be used to offset an uncontested debt"); Faber Coe & 
(?reggf in<?T yT n y s t National BanK O£ Cfricago, 107 i n . App. 2d 
204, 246 N. E. 2d 96, 99 (111. 1969) ("A matured indebtedness to 
give rise to a right of set off must be certain, already reduced 
to precise figures or capable of being liquidated by calculation 
without the intervention of a court or jury to estimate them"); 
Associated Oil Company of Wyoming v. Rector, 50 P. 2d 551, 560 
(Colo. 1935) ("A set off or counterclaim does not amount to 
payment, since there has been no delivery of money by the debtor 
to the creditor. ") See also 80 C.J.S. Setoff and Counterclaim § 
42b. 
Thus, the Lewises cannot claim the right to set off any 
unliquidated damages to which they might be entitled for the 
alleged waste committed by Stateline against the liquidated and 
calculable redemption amount that they owe to Stateline under 
Rule 69(f)(3). This principle of law is entirely consistent with 
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the scheme set forth in Rule 69, which provides that the 
redemption amount must be paid when due (Rule 69(f)(3)) in spite 
of claims for waste, which are to be resolved by a separate 
action following the redemption (Rule 69(g)(1)). 
The Lewises argue that the unliquidated claim for waste 
may be set off because it is a recoupment arising from the same 
transaction as the cause of action rather than a mere setoff. 
(Lewises7 Brief, at 28.) They cite Rogue River Management Co. v. 
Shaw. 243 Ore. 54, 411 P. 2d 440 (1966). Rogue, however, involved 
a specific, overpayment of an undisputed amount, which is a far 
cry from the speculative, unliquidated damages asserted by the 
Lewises. Moreover, as the Rogue court points out, recoupment may 
be used only defensively by a defendant against a plaintiff s 
claim. i&. at 443. £&& MarH vil Financial Consultants 
Corporation v. Smedlev. 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah App. 
1990) (a "recoupment" is available where "a defendant receives a 
rebate on plaintiff's claim arising from the same transaction"). 
Stateline has not made any claims against the Lewises in this or 
any other case and is only a party because it purchased the 
property at a sheriff s sale. The Lewises are attempting to use 
the doctrine of recoupment affirmatively, which they cannot do. 
In addition, the Lewises' claim for waste is more 
accurately termed a set-off than a recoupment since the Lewises' 
claim for damages, if they had one, does not arise from the same 
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transaction as does Stateline' s right to be paid by a 
redemptioner. The Rogue court defined recoupment as follows: 
"Recoupment," "set-off" and "counterclaim" are not 
synonymous terms. "'Recoupment' [which was a defense 
at common law] is defined to be ' the keeping back and 
stopping something which is due. ' " . . . The term is of 
French origin and means the "cutting back" of the 
plaintiff s claim by the defendant. Recoupment is 
confined to matters arising out of and connected with 
the transaction upon which the action is brought. 
Id. at 442 (citations omitted. )14 
The Lewises also relied on Freston v. Gulf Oil Co. , 565 
P. 2d 787 (Utah 1977). As with Rogue, that case involved a 
specific, undisputed overpayment, not unliquidated, speculative 
damages. Moreover, Freston states that recoupment is inherent in 
contractual matters, i£. at 789, while the present case is not a 
contractual matter, but a strictly construed statutory right of 
redemption. £&£ Mollerw Vt Storage System international, 569 
P. 2d at 1124. 
This Court should hold that the Lewises' had no right 
to assert a setoff of their unliquidated damages (suffered on 
14
 The Utah Court of Appeals stated in dicta in Mark VII 
Financial Consultants Corporation v, ?meflley, 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 
22 (Utah App. 1990), that the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure essentially dissolve any distinctions between 
recoupment, setoff, and counterclaim. !£. at 23. The 
distinction may have application, however, in the present case 
where Stateline is not a party to the action, having never been 
served with process, and is not suing the Lewises. 
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property they do not own) against the liquidated redemption 
amount. 
III. 
REQUIRING STATELINE TO DEFEND AN ACTION FOR 
WASTE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 69(f)(3) 
WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
Stateline is not a party to this action and has never 
been served with process or with a complaint. Forcing Stateline, 
as the purchaser in this case, to defend the Lewises' claims for 
damages without ever having been served with process, as required 
by Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is inconsistent with 
the requirements of due process. 
Rule 69 very clearly sets forth the proper method for 
addressing issues of waste: a redemptioner must first make his 
estate absolute by paying the full redemption amount required by 
Rule 69(f)(3) and obtaining title to the property. If he 
believes he has a claim for damages based on waste that occurred 
during the redemption period, he is then entitled to file a 
separate action against the tenant in possession who allegedly 
caused the waste. Such an action would proceed through the 
normal course of litigation, including discovery and the usual 
trial preparation. 
The interpretation of the rule argued by the Lewises 
would place Stateline in an untenable position: Stateline would 
either be required to prepare for and attend a hearing on the 
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waste issue without adequate time for discovery and 
preparation15 or, if the matter were placed on a normal trial 
calendar, Stateline would be required to wait an inordinate 
amount of time before the issue could be resolved so that it 
could obtain clear title to the property or a repayment of its 
purchase price. 
The Lewises rely upon three very dated cases to support 
their conclusion that a purchaser becomes a party to an action in 
which a foreclosure has been decreed. (Lewises' Brief, at 33. ) 
All three cases, however, simply state that purchasers who bid 
upon property at a sheriff's sale subject themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the court, which has the duty to confirm the sale 
and are liable to pay the amount of their bid. These cases do 
not support the contention that a purchaser is subject to a suit 
assessing damages for waste which is unconnected with the 
sheriff s sale without having been named as a defendant or served 
with process. 
In Hansen v. Day. 99 Or. 387, 195 P. 344 (1921) (en 
banc), the Oregon Supreme Court faced facts almost identical to 
this case. In Hansen, the redeeming party served notice upon the 
purchaser within the statutory period of intent to redeem the 
13
 Rule 69(f)(3) provides that the hearing may be held on 
two days' notice which, if the Lewises' interpretation of the 
Rule were correct, would be an entirely inadequate amount of time 
within which to prepare to defend claims for damages for waste. 
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property sold in a foreclosure sale. The amount of purchase, 
interest and taxes was undisputed, but the redeeming party 
claimed the right to set off against the redemption amount the 
amount of alleged waste committed by the purchasers. The parties 
could not agree on the amount of any reduction and the redemption 
period expired. The redeeming party claimed that the purchaser 
was insolvent, and therefore that equity should allow the amount 
of damages as an offset against the redemption amount since any 
redemption money paid would go to the purchaser' s creditors, 
leaving no remedy for the redeeming party upon liquidation of her 
claim for waste. L&. at 345. The court held that the redeeming 
party was not engaged in litigation with the purchaser and the 
sheriff could not set off the amount of redemption. Id. 
Furthermore, the allegation of insolvency was not substantiated 
so equity could not compel a set off. Id. 
The Lewises rely upon Cogswell v. Brown. 102 Wash. 625, 
173 P. 623 (1918), to support the argument that a separate action 
to determine waste is not essential. Yet Cogswell involved "the 
suit of the owner for an accounting" which was brought "within 
the timm for redemption. " I&. at 624. In Cogswell' s suit for an 
accounting the defendant was presumably named and served with a 
complaint, and the trial allowed for adequate discovery and 
inquiry into the allegations against the defendant. In the 
present case, however, the Lewises seek to have the question of 
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waste determined in a hearing provided for by Rule 69(f)(3), 
within the framework of statutory redemption. (Lewises' Brief, 
at 38. ) In Cogswell, however, the court noted that the statutory 
right to redeem was not relevant, having expired, and the suit 
was in equity for an accounting. 173 P. at 623-24. The Lewises 
take inconsistent positions by appealing for equitable relief, 
while urging the Court to adopt mechanisms intended for legal 
relief under the statute. 
The cases the Lewises cited in support of allowing a 
set-off and recoupment similarly involved parties who were named 
in the particular court proceeding, whose rights were determined 
at trial and not under a limited expedited hearing process such 
as that provided under Rule 69(f)(3). See Rogue River Management 
CQi YT ShfrW, 243 Or. 54, 411 P. 2d 440 (1966); Fr?§tQn yT gylf Qil 
Co.. 565 P.2d 787 (Utah 1977). 
IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN HEARING 
STATELINE' S MOTION TO DISSOLVE THE 
COURT' S EX PARTE ORDER EXTENDING 
THE REDEMPTION PERIOD ON TWO DAYS' NOTICE 
AND IN ORDERING THE LEWISES TO PAY 
THE FULL REDEMPTION AMOUNT INTO COURT 
BY THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON OCTOBER 3. 
A. The lewises were not prejudiced by haying only two flay? 
notice Q£ the hearing on September 9> 1999* 
The Lewises also argue that they had insufficient time 
to prepare for the September 8, 1989, hearing regarding the 
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appropriateness of the extension of the redemption period, having 
received only two days' notice. (Lewises' Brief, at 16-17.) 
That hearing was in direct response to the ex parte order 
obtained by the Lewises' on August 28, 1989, of which Stateline 
received no notice16 and at which Stateline' s property rights 
were at issue. As a result of that ex parte hearing, Stateline 
was prevented from receiving clear title to the property that it 
had purchased six months earlier. It should not have come as a 
surprise to the Lewises' counsel that Stateline would demand a 
prompt hearing in response to the ex parte hearing. 
At the hearing on September 8, 1989, the court 
overruled the Lewises' objection that they had received 
inadequate notice of the hearing. Judge Wilkinson stated: 
I don' t think it' s unreasonable--I don' t care what type 
of motion it is or whether it' s under an injunction or 
not—for them to request a hearing immediately on an ex 
parte matter of that sort. And for you to come here 
now and object to a hearing at this time, vou don' t 
impress me as coming with glean hands* 
(Transcript of Sept. 8 hearing, at 13; emphasis added.) 
This Court has recognized that the five-day notice 
requirement of Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "is not 
16
 The record demonstrates that on the day of the ex parte 
hearing before Judge Wilkinson, counsel for the Lewises spoke 
with Stateline' s counsel on the phone, but did not disclose the 
fact that the Lewises intended to seek an extension of the 
redemption period from the court. (Affidavit of Ervin R. Holmes, 
MI 4-5, R. 583. ) 
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a hard fast rule, and the trial court may dispense with the 
technical compliance thereof if there be satisfactory proof that 
a party had actual notice and time to prepare.u Jensen v. Eames, 
30 Utah 2d. 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974). The Lewises had 
actual notice two days in advance and the hearing was in direct 
response to the ex parte order previously obtained by the 
Lewises. 
Furthermore, the August 28th order extending the 
redemption period was, in effect, a temporary restraining order 
that prevented Stateline from perfecting its title to the 
property through receipt of a Sheriff s deed. Without clear 
title, Stateline was restrained from treating the property as its 
own. Under Rule 65A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Stateline 
was entitled to an expedited hearing on its motion to dissolve 
the court' s order with two days notice to the opposing party. It 
satisfied this requirement. (R. 586-88. ) 
Whether the Lewises had adequate notice for the 
September 8th hearing is also moot because the Lewises did not 
suffer prejudice from the hearing. Notwithstanding its bench 
ruling on September 8, 1989, the court extended the redemption 
period through October 3, 1989, (R. 652-54), only seven days 
short of the original extension to October 10, 1989. The Lewises 
can hardly complain that they were prejudiced by only receiving 
two days' notice of the hearing on September 8. 
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B. The Lewises hafl frflegyste time to tender the redemption 
amount into court-
The Lewises also complain that the court did not allow 
them enough time to pay the full redemption amount into court. 
They claim that allowing one day after the October 2 hearing to 
make the tender was unfair and an "impossible requirement." 
(Lewises' Brief, at 19. ) If being able to tender the money 
pursuant to the court's order was "impossible" it does not appear 
from the record. The Lewises failed to object to the order at 
the October 2 hearing but, rather, assured the court that "[t]he 
money is there. They [Stateline] can have it." (Oct. 2 
Transcript, R. 661, at 15. ) The Lewises' counsel assured the 
court that the money was available, and the conditions on the 
money could be easily satisfied. IJ&. at 28-30. The Lewises' 
complain that the court' s order of October 2 was unreasonable, 
yet they were given ample opportunity following the hearing of 
September 8 within which to raise and tender the redemption 
amount. On that date, the court informed the Lewises that they 
would need to tender the full redemption amount in order to 
preserve their redemption rights. Thus the Lewises, in fact, 
were given twenty-five days (from September 8 to October 3, 1989) 
to raise the funds and to clear any preconditions to tender. 
This is not even considering the full six months which had 
already expired following the sheriff s sale on February 28, 
-44-
G:\wpt\088\0000083x.w51 
1989. This Court should hold that the lower court did not abuse 
its discretion in ordering the Lewises to pay the full amount 
into court by the close of business on October 3, 1989. 
CQNCLU$IQN 
The rules governing the right of redemption are clear 
and should be strictly adhered to by the Lewises, as would-be 
redemptioners. The Lewises failed to comply with Rule 69(f)(3) 
by tendering the full redemption amount within the six month 
period following the sheriff s sale. Moreover, the Lewises 
failed to tender the full amount, even after the court gave them 
extensions until October 3, 1989, within which to do so. The 
Lewises have had ample opportunity to redeem the property and 
this Court should affirm the order of the lower court that the 
Lewises' redemption rights lapsed for failure to make a proper 
tender of the full amount due. This Court should hold that any 
claims for alleged waste are to be made in accordance with Rule 
69(g)(1), only after the a redemptioner has made his estate in 
the property absolute. As a purchaser at the sheriff s sale held 
on February 28, 1989, Stateline' s right to receive the full use 
and title to the property that it purchased has been compromised 
and clouded by the Lewises' failure to follow the specific 
procedures described in Rule 69. This Court should affirm the 
lower court's Order of October 13, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
Stateline appends to this Brief a copy of the lower 
court' s Order dated October 13, 1989, from which the Lewises have 
taken their appeal. 
DATED this ' J day of June, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
/> 1 * 
By jL~7 ^^u^yi^Jj) 
R. Steph'en Marshall 
Attorneys for Appellee Stateline 
Properties, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Stateline Properties, 
Inc. , to be hand-delivered this { ^  day of June, 1990, to the 
following: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Backman, Clark & Marsh 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main St. , 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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A 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
• R. Stephen Marshall, #2097 
Marilyn M. Henriksen, #4336 
Attorneys for Stateline Properties, Inc. 
„ 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
,1 P. 0. Box 45340 
•I Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
, Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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[l IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
| STATE OF UTAH 
l| PATRICIA HUSTON, TRUSTEE OF 
I, TRUST A AND TRUST B UNDER 
jj JOHN HUSTON, DECEASED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
! A.R. SPAULDING and JOYCE || SPAULDING, et al. , 
Defendants and Cross -
Claim Plaintiffs and 
Defendants. 
I| The above-captioned action came on for hearing before 
J the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, of the above-entitled Court, 
I on October 2, 1989. Defendants Russell and Mitzi Lewis were 
represented by Ralph J. Marsh of the law firm of Backman, Clark 
& Marsh. Stateline Properties, Inc., was represented by R. 
Stephen Marshall of the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
I & McCarthy. The Court heard argument on the Lewises' 
I objections to the proposed order on the Court's ruling of 
ORDER 
Civil No. 83-116 
000655 
September 8, 1989, and on Stateline Properties, Inc.'s motion 
to strike hearing. Having heard the arguments of counsel and 
having considered the respective memoranda filed by the 
parties, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendants Russell R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis 
(collectively, the "Lewises") shall deposit in an escrow 
account the total sum of $256,599.45, less any amounts that the 
Lewises have previously paid into Court in this matter, and 
shall further cause the title company, or other escrow agent, 
to make and deliver to counsel for Stateline Properties, Inc., 
by October 3, 1989, at 5:00 p.m., a written acknowledgement 
that such funds (in collected funds) are being held in escrow 
and a written commitment to promptly pay the full amount of 
such sum held in escrow to the order of Stateline Properties, 
Inc., concurrently with conveyance to Russell R. Lewis and 
Mitzi Lewis of fee title to, and the granting of a first lien 
on, the real property located in Tooele County, State of Utah, 
that is the subject of the above-captioned action, more 
particularly described below: 
Beginning on the Westerly side of D Street at a 
point North 25°45' West 210.00 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Block 13, Wendover Plat "A", 
a subdivision of parts of Sections 17, 18 and 19, 
Township A South, Range 19 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and running thence Sout 64°15f West 
520.00 feet; thence North 25°45f West 90.00 feet; 
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thence South 64°15' West 175.00 feet; thence 
North 25°45f West 151.63 feet; thence North 
64°15' East 188.10 feet; thence North 25°45' West 
108.89 feet to the Southerly right of way line of 
Highway 40-50; thence along said right of way 
line North 73°36f East 513.73 feet to the 
Westerly line of D Street; thence South 25°45f 
East 267.06 feet to the point of beginning. 
Reserving unto the Sellers, their successors or 
assigns, a right of way over a 20 foot wide 
roadway, the center line of which is described as 
follows: 
Beginning on the Westerly side of D. Street at a 
point North 25°45f West 290.00 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Block 13 aforesaid, and 
running thence South 64°15' West 530.00 feet, 
more or less; thence North 25°45f West 161.63 
feet, more or less; thence North 115.00 feet more 
or less, to the Westerly right of way of U.S. 
40-50. 
It is understood and agreed that said right of 
way as above described may cross over a part of a 
certain Lot 2, not conveyed but adjoining 
thereto, and in the event that said right of way 
crossing over said Lot 2 is at any time 
discontinued, for any reason whatsoever, said 
reserved right of way shall be re-routed to the 
East of said Lot 2 over property described above 
so as to insure continuous accessibility to U.S. 
Highway 40-50. 
Subject to all easements and rights of way of 
record and all utility lines presently existing 
on the said property and all easements and rights 
of way, not of record, but which may be 
established by prescriptive use, if any. 
Subject to the first right of Federal Government 
employees and to the second right of employees of 
the Western Pacific Railroad to the first 
vacancies available at the prevailing rates. 
Excepting all oil and mineral rights. 
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I 
That no part of said property shall be used as a 
service station for the sale of petroleum 
I! products. 
11
 The written promise and commitment of the title company, or 
other escrow agent, to pay the full amount held in escrow to 
I Stateline Properties, Inc., shall be absolute and subject to no 
conditions other than the conveyance of fee title to the 
i Lewises and the granting of a first lien on the subject 
ij property, as provided above. 
[I 2. If defendants Russell R. and Mitzi Lewis fail to 
j' comply fully with the requirements of paragraph 1 of this Order 
I by October 3, 1989, at 5:00 p.m.; or if, at any time, the money 
I 
J deposited by defendants, as provided in paragraph 1 of this 
j Order, becomes unavailable, or is withdrawn, or the payment of 
jl such sum becomes subject to any conditions other than those 
'' described in paragraph 1; or if the full amount due is not 
l 
i! immediately paid to Stateline Properties, Inc., on order of the 
Court, then the Lewises' redemption rights shall be deemed to 
il have irrevocably lapsed and shall be of no further force or 
I effect under Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
otherwise. 
3. In the event, and only in the event, that the 
J Lewises comply fully with paragraph 1 of this Order by October 
|j 3, 1989, at 5:00 p.m., the Lewises shall then file a petition 
il 
1
 with the Court and shall cause such petition to be served on 
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Stateline Properties, Inc., in accordance with Rule 4, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, containing any claims for waste or 
I1 injury to the property that the Lewises believe that they have 
j against Stateline Properties, Inc. On receipt of service of 
• such petition, Stateline Properties, Inc., shall file an answer 
' with the Court. The parties shall thereafter be entitled to 
1
 pursue discovery on the issues raised by the pleadings and 
• ! shall be entitled to a trial of all such issues. The 
, litigation of such claims shall be governed by the Utah Rules 
I 
I of Civil Procedure. If the Lewises' fail to prove that they 
have been damaged by Stateline Properties, Inc., then Stateline 
shall immediately be entitled to receive the sums deposited 
into Court and the escrow, together with interest thereon at 
the legal rate in an amount to be determined by the Court. 
DATED this / 3 day of October, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
~ 7 ^— / 7*^pc£— - — 
/Homer F. Wilkinson 
/ District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ' 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
By 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Attorneys for defendants 
Russell R. and Mitzi lewis 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
7 r^ » 
of the within and foregoing Order to be hand delivered this ; 
day of October, 1989, to the following: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis 
800 Mclntyre Building 
68 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
and mailed, postage prepaid, the %? day of October, 1989 to 
the following: 
Ben E. Rawlings and 
R. Scott Rawlings 
Armstrong, Rawlings & West 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Clark W. Sessions 
Sessions & Moore 
Attorneys for Surety Life 
Insurance Company 
400 First Federal Plaza 
505 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
W. Kevin Jackson 
Jensen, Duffin, Dibb & Jackson 
Attorneys for A. R. Spaulding 
and Joyce Spaulding 
311 South State, #380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Watkiss & Campbell 
Attorneys for Marcia Merrill 
310 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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100289 
Rowland H. Merrill, Jr. 
c/o Dean's Great Little Lodge 
1821 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Stephen P. Bruno 
8261 Maio Drive 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
Bruce M. Hale 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation 
124 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
George A. Pappas 
3475 South 700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Dino S. Pappas 
3007 South 2515 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
James R. Williams 
1329 West 7125 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
Debbie J. Williams 
1329 West 7125 South 
West Jordan, Utah 84084 
James E. Hogle, Jr. 
1018 Oak Hills Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
[2>yl4A/Ay\A*Ju 
a£a* 
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